Kantian Synthesis. In a previous post, I discussed Kantian synthesis, which accounts for the action of consciousness in terms of both receptivity, and spontaneity. The synthesizing Kantian consciousness does not just receive impressions and copy them, but actively puts them together, so as to construct coherent objects in an interconnected web of causal relationships over time, structured by articulate concepts.
I defend the synthetic view of consciousness, since it seems that a synthetic activity, based on innate structures, is necessary to build the kind of experience we have. Our experience is not simply a reception of individual moments of impressions. If all we receive are individual inputs of impressions, our experience would consist of nothing but fragments. And yet, we weave together various sensations, from the eyes, ears, tactile faculties, etc., to generate notions of complex but unified objects. Sensations begin as a manifold, i.e. just a hodgepodge of diverse sensations. They do not come to the mind as ready-made wholes, but only as individual units. Kant writes that “it has been believed that the senses do not merely afford us impressions but also put them together…” (Critique of Pure Reason, A121). But, this view is erroneous, since the mind cannot base its unified experience on just “dispersed and separate” individual units of impressions the senses receive.
Is Synthesis Enough? But, is the synthetic view of consciousness enough to account for the complexity of our experience? Yes, our consciousness synthesizes objects, but there even deeper layers to our experience that exceed the mere construction of unified objects.
Meaning and Value. In this post, I would like to point out the layers of experience associated with meaning and value. Our experience consists not only in discrete and unified objects, but these objects have a meaning for us. For instance, we can synthesize the various sensations of an apple, uniting them into a stable substance that has an identity over time. But, the mere appearance of the apple, does not capture its full significance. The apple has meaning, a kind of significance that is independent of the physical properties of the apple. For example, the apple is something we eat. We might plan to use the apple for cooking. The apple might evoke memories. The apple could have a certain emotional significance, as certain artists might highlight in still life paintings involving an apple. All this meaning, is over and above the material dimensions of the apple. We do not perceive these intangible meanings in the shape of the apple, the unity of its sensations, the substantial ground that brings together its various parts. The meaning is not a physical property of the apple, but it is a key part of the experience of the apple.
The apple, as well as other features of our experience, of course, also has value. We judge the apple as good or bad, and this judgment is independent of the material objecthood of the apple. Goodness or badness are also not physical properties of the apple, like its color or shape. The apple’s goodness or badness depends on context. A rotten apple could be neutral, if it is just lying on the ground, fallen from a tree. Or, it could be bad, if it is on our kitchen counter and we wanted to eat it. The value of the apple is an interaction with our particular subjectivity.
Heidegger. To develop this extra layer of experience, involving meaning and value, I turn to the thought of Martin Heidegger. In his work, Being and Time, Heidegger develops the notion of a totality. The idea of a totality means that we do not view individual things in isolation. Instead, each entity is connected with a whole host of other entities, in an interconnected network. We can see this unified totality in the various academic disciplines. Biology does not stand alone, but has a connection to chemistry and physics, since these latter disciplines constitute the basic core of living biological organisms. Art does not stand alone, but incorporates philosophy, literature, mythology, etc (Being and Time, 9).
The totality means that each individual thing stands against a background of Being itself. Individual things are, most fundamentally, things that exist. So, to understand an individual thing—a desk, a chair, an apple—we must first have an idea of what it means to be.
The idea of a totality captures, in part, the notions of meaning and value in our experience. We do not just experience individual things, but individual things in terms of larger contexts of meaning and purpose. We see an apple in relation to other things, such as when we use it make a pie, to provide a healthy snack in cooperation with our doctor, when we use it for a painting, etc. The meaning of the apple shifts according to our perspective, and according to our very basic ideas of Being itself. The apple is an instance of what it means to be. Maybe we view the apple in terms of God’s creation, if we believe in a Supreme Being. Or, if we are materialists, we may view an apple in terms of just an accidental collection of atoms.
The color of the apple may evoke associations, as with the color of lipstick, or of blood. Even something as simple as an apple is not just a discrete object with material dimensions, but part of a totality of meaning that shifts over time and from person to person.
Life’s Meaning. I think the notion of totality, taken together, brings us to an awareness of what we might describe as life’s meaning. When we strive for meaning in life, we are looking for some overarching goal that organizes all our activities. People might have a religious meaning to their lives, and this means that there is an interconnecting thread, a totality of significance, that orients their life to a divine being. People might also organize their lives around a political ideology, or a coveted pleasure.
So, we do not just synthesize individual objects, but we organize them into a general map of significance. I want to close this essay by pointing out the meaning of anxiety in Heidegger. Anxiety shows how powerful the significance of the totality of meaning in our lives is.
Anxiety. Anxiety in Heidegger is different from fear. Fear focuses on a specific entity within the world. We might be afraid of a particular person, or of a rabid racoon, or of heights, etc.
Anxiety, though, lacks a specific target. There is no specific location or source of anxiety, since it has to do with the world in general (Being and Time, 187). Anxiety has to do with a sense of the totality of significance. When we feel anxiety, we experience a bottoming out of our sense of the significance of the whole. We are not just afraid of one thing, but we experience a collapse of a general totality of significance.
Anxiety is a very fragile moment, in which our entire worldview faces collapse. Anxiety is not just a matter of losing focus on one particular entity: not getting a coveted job, a particular car, or a relationship failing. Anxiety is a collapse of our overarching narrative of the Being of the world, the meaning of Being for every existing thing.
So, anxiety shows that consciousness is more than just the synthesis of individual objects! We unite individual objects in general maps of meaning, that can undergo changes and evolve over the course of our lives.
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